Whistleblower Protection Act Amendment Bill tabled in Parliament

Introduction

On 6 March 2025, the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department for law and institutional reform, Azalina Othman Said tabled the Whistleblower Protection (Amendment) Bill 2025 (“the Bill”) for its first reading.

For context, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 (“NACS”) was launched by the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, on 7 May 2024. The NACS is an essential part of Malaysia’s reform agenda, providing a detailed plan for fighting corruption, and is a continuation and enhancement of the National Anti-Corruption Plan (“NACP”) initiated in 2019.

The vision under the NACS is to lead Malaysia towards a corrupt-free and prosperous nation. The three-fold mission of the NACS is as follows:

1. To Uphold the Rule of Law;
2. To Create a Culture of Transparency and Accountability; and
3. To Encourage Participation Among Communities in Anti-Corruption Efforts.

One of the five strategies under the NACS is “Enforcement”, and the introduction of the Bill forms part of the government’s sub-strategy within this framework.

In this article, we will explore the key changes to the Bill, and whether it is in line with the government’s vision and mission under the NACS.

The Current Legal Framework for Whistleblower Protection

The Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 (“WPA”) was introduced to encourage individuals to report wrongdoing by providing legal protections against retaliation. However, the WPA has significant limitations, particularly in the scope of protection and the restrictive nature of disclosure channels. Under the current law, whistleblowers are only protected if they make disclosures to enforcement agencies, which has deterred many from coming forward, especially in cases involving government corruption. Additionally, the existence of other laws, such as the Official Secrets Act 1972 (“OSA”) and section 203A of the Penal Code[1], has criminalised certain disclosures, further weakening the effectiveness of the WPA. These issues highlight the need for a more robust legal framework that truly safeguards whistleblowers.[2]

Key Amendments and Their Implications

The government has stated that the Bill aims to strengthen safeguards for whistleblowers and enhancing public confidence in reporting misconduct. Below are the key amendments introduced by the Bill.

Establishment of the Whistleblower Protection Committee – Introduction of a new Section 5A

The Bill introduces a Whistleblower Protection Committee tasked with overseeing the implementation of the WPA 2010 and collecting data on whistleblower complaints.

While the establishment of this committee is a positive step, it falls short of addressing the larger structural issue—Malaysia still lacks a centralised whistleblower protection agency.

In its media statement, the Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (“C4 Center”) has rightly pointed out that this committee appears to be a temporary fix rather than a long-term solution. The government should set a clear timeline for the establishment of a dedicated whistleblower protection agency with well-defined powers and responsibilities. Moreover, the Bill does not specify criteria for appointing committee members, raising concerns about their independence and effectiveness. There should be a transparent appointment process that includes representatives from civil society and academia to ensure credibility.

Removal of Section 6 Proviso

The removal of the proviso that denied protection to whistleblowers if their disclosures were prohibited by other laws is one of the most significant improvements in the Bill.

Laws such as the OSA and Section 203A of the Penal Code have prevented whistleblowers from exposing government misconduct. With this amendment, whistleblowers who follow the WPA 2010’s reporting procedures will now receive legal protection, even if the disclosed information was previously classified under restrictive laws.

To go a step further, it is recommended that the government introduces a “notwithstanding clause” into the WPA which expressly stipulates that provisions under the WPA shall prevail over any written laws prohibiting disclo­sure of any information involving matters of public interest or improper conduct.

Amendment to Section 11(a) – Protection for Whistleblowers Involved in Misconduct

Currently, Section 11(a) states:

“(1) The enforcement agency shall revoke the whistleblower protection conferred under section 7 if it is of the opinion, based on its investigation or in the course of its investigation that-

(a) the whistleblower himself has participated in the improper conduct disclosed;

The Bill amends Section 11(a) by inserting the word “wilfully” after the words “the whistleblower himself has”.

While prima facie it provides some leniency, it is still rather problematic. This ignores a fundamental reality: corruption often operates in secrecy, and the best way to expose it is through whistleblowing. Many insiders who witness or facilitate corruption are the only ones with knowledge of these activities.

The questions to be asked are:

1. Should it matter if the whistleblower participated in the improper conduct?
2. Should the motivation for reporting make a difference?

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not require whistleblowers to be completely “innocent” of the wrongdoing they report. The focus should primarily be on the reported misconduct, rather than the nature or motives of the whistleblower. Indeed, this approach has been adopted in several jurisdictions, with Ireland being the first country to recognize the irrelevance of the motivation for whistleblowing in its law.[3]

This reflects a practical approach—the primary objective is to combat corruption, not to punish those who help uncover it.

Other Missed Opportunities

Disclosure channels

One of the main criticisms of the WPA is its limited disclosure channels, which are restricted to enforcement agencies. Section 6(1) mandates that whistleblowers must report wrongdoing only to enforcement agencies, effectively excluding internal reporting mechanisms within organisations. Additionally, Section 8(1) prohibits whistleblowers from disclosing to third parties any information initially reported to an enforcement agency. This restriction creates significant obstacles for potential whistleblowers, as many may need to consult lawyers, close confidants, or support organisations before making a report.

These provisions, when combined with Section 11(1)(f), create a serious risk for whistleblowers. Not only can whistleblowers lose protection for making an initial disclosure outside an enforcement agency, but if it is later discovered that they had shared information with third parties—before or after reporting to an enforcement agency—their protection may be revoked.

Most importantly, limiting disclosures to enforcement agencies ignores a critical issue: the possibility that the agency itself is complicit in the misconduct, whether directly or indirectly. This exposes whistleblowers to serious risks, leaving them vulnerable to retaliation without alternative avenues for reporting. Expanding the disclosure channels to independent bodies, Parliament, or civil society organisations would offer greater security and encourage more whistleblowers to come forward.

Notably, it was reported that the government made has no plans to amend the Whistleblower Protection Act 2010 (Act 711) to protect individuals who make public disclosures before reporting to enforcement agencies. However, it is hoped that the government will reconsider this stance and take meaningful steps to address the issue.

Lack of a Mechanism to Challenge Enforcement Agencies’ Decisions

A major flaw in the WPA is the absence of an independent mechanism to review enforcement agencies’ decisions on whistleblower protection. Under Section 11(3), an individual aggrieved by the agency’s decision—whether to grant or revoke protection—may refer the matter to the courts for determination. However, this provision fails to provide a practical avenue for whistleblowers to challenge unfair or arbitrary decisions.

First, court proceedings are costly and time-consuming, making it difficult for whistleblowers—who may already face financial hardship due to retaliation—to seek redress. Second, court challenges risk exposing the whistleblower’s identity, undermining the very protection the law is meant to provide. The need for anonymity is paramount in many whistleblower cases, and requiring them to litigate in open court creates a serious deterrent to seeking justice.

The temporary Whistleblower Protection Committee introduced in the Bill does not resolve this issue. The Committee's role is limited to monitoring and data collection, with no decision-making authority to review or overturn enforcement agencies’ determinations. Without an independent appeals mechanism, whistleblowers remain at the mercy of enforcement agencies, with no viable recourse if protection is unfairly denied or revoked. A specialised Whistleblower Tribunal or Ombudsman should be established to provide a confidential, accessible, and independent review process, ensuring whistleblowers are not left without protection due to flawed or biased agency decisions.

Does the Bill Align with the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2024-2028?

The NACS 2024-2028 emphasises Malaysia’s commitment to achieving a corruption-free society, with a zero-tolerance approach towards graft. It sets a clear target for Malaysia to rank among the top 25 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index within the next 10 years.

A fundamental aspect of the NACS is enhancing governance, transparency, and enforcement mechanisms. While the Bill introduces some improvements, it does not go far enough to support Malaysia’s anti-corruption goals. Greater transparency is crucial for the success of Malaysia’s anti-corruption efforts.

If the Malaysian government is serious about its anti-corruption agenda, further reforms must be introduced to ensure whistleblower protections are not just symbolic, but effective and practical.

Conclusion

The Whistleblower Protection (Amendment) Bill 2025 introduces some positive reforms, particularly the removal of Section 6’s proviso and the creation of a Whistleblower Protection Committee. However, it falls short of establishing a truly effective framework. Key gaps remain, including the lack of discretionary powers for enforcement agencies, restricted disclosure channels, absence of physical protection, and missing support services.

The NACS 2024-2028 envisions a transparent and corruption-free Malaysia, but this Bill does not fully support that vision. The government must take this opportunity to address the remaining gaps and strengthen whistleblower protection laws to effectively encourage disclosures and combat corruption at all levels.

This article is written by Raja Nadhil Aqran (Partner). It only contains general information. It does not constitute legal advice nor an expression oflegal opinion and should not be relied upon as such.

For more information, contact us at info@aqranvijandran.com.

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[1] For the full report titled Whistleblower Protection or Suppression? A Decade of Section 203A of the Penal Code by the Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4 Center) – Co-authored by Arief Hamizan, Jason Poh Hong Lee and Raja Nadhil Aqran, click here.

[2] The importance of whistleblowing as a tool to combat corruption was discussed here.

[3] Section 5(7) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2014 of Ireland.

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